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Abstract 
The Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA) embodies the first set of new multilateral rules to have 
been negotiated under auspices of the WTO since the launch of the Doha Development Agenda, part 
of a small package of decisions centering on matters of interest to developing countries that was 
“harvested” from the broader Doha round. This paper analyzes the outcome of the trade facilitation 
talks, assesses the role of the epistemic community that provided information to negotiators and 
reflects on the lessons and possible implications of the TFA experience for the prospects for new rule-
making and cooperation on regulatory matters in the WTO. The TFA illustrates both the potential and 
the difficulty of negotiating generally applicable stand-alone agreements in the WTO and 
demonstrates the importance of issue linkage in achieving cooperation in trade policy matters. 
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Trade facilitation, trade agreements, issue linkage, WTO, economic development. 
JEL codes: F13, F53, O24, R11 
  
  
 
 1 
1. Introduction* 
At the Bali Ministerial meeting in December 2013 WTO members successfully concluded the first 
multilateral agreement since the launch of the Doha Round in 2001. The Agreement on Trade 
Facilitation (TFA) continues the trend that was initiated in the Uruguay Round for negotiated 
disciplines to center on so-called “positive integration” – agreement to pursue specific practices and 
approaches to a policy area as opposed to agreement to refrain from using certain policies (e.g., 
quotas, export subsidies) or commitments not to exceed a negotiated level of protection for a product 
(e.g., tariff bindings).  
The TFA is noteworthy in a number of ways beyond being the first agreement on new rules to have 
been negotiated under WTO auspices in almost 20 years.  
 It is part of a small package of decisions centering on matters of interest to developing country 
WTO members that was “harvested” from the broader set of issues on the table in the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations.  
 It has universal WTO membership and its disciplines apply in principle to all WTO Members, but 
it embodies an extensive à la carte approach to determining the timing of implementation by 
developing countries of its various disciplines.  
 It goes beyond setting trade policy disciplines, calling for joint action by donor countries, 
development assistance providers and developing country WTO members to assist the latter to 
implement some provisions of the agreement.  
 It incorporates a mechanism for experts to assess whether and why a developing country is not 
able to implement commitments according to the timeframe it scheduled before recourse can be 
made to the dispute settlement to enforce implementation.  
 Despite having been agreed by consensus at the 9
th
 WTO Ministerial conference, it continues the 
pattern established during the Doha Round of not meeting deadlines set by Ministers. The Bali 
Ministerial declaration called for a Protocol of Amendment incorporating the TFA into the WTO 
to be adopted before July 31, 2014. India blocked such adoption at the WTO General Council 
meeting held at the end of July 2014—not because it was opposed to the TFA but because it 
insisted on the WTO Members meeting its demands in another area (agriculture).  
The TFA reflects a major effort by WTO Members to craft an agreement that extends WTO rules in a 
way that addresses the concerns of developing nations regarding implementation costs and capacity 
constraints. It may be the shape of things to come for multilateral cooperation on trade policy matters. 
It may also constitute the end of efforts to conclude universal agreements under WTO auspices on 
regulatory policies. Very different views can be (and have been) expressed regarding the TFA by trade 
policy analysts and commentators, regarding both the substance of its provisions and the implications 
of the Indian refusal to agree to adoption of the TFA Protocol in July 2014. 
The narrative coming from the WTO Secretariat (e.g., Neufeld, 2014), international organizations 
and most governments is that the TFA is a major milestone for the WTO because it addresses an area 
of policy that is of great importance from an economic development perspective and national welfare. 
It is also a milestone in demonstrating that WTO Members are able to agree on new rules and 
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disciplines that apply to all countries and that the organization is capable of fulfilling its legislative 
function in addition to its transparency and dispute settlement functions. It demonstrates an ability to 
be innovative in recognizing differences in implementation capacity across nations by calling on 
developing countries to determine when they will apply specific provisions of the agreement and by 
linking implementation of some disciplines to the delivery of assistance from developed nations. 
But some analysts who are otherwise strong supporters of action on trade facilitation and believe 
this is a key priority from an economic development perspective worry that the TFA may be a mistake 
for the WTO. They point to the fact that it moves the WTO away from binding, enforceable 
commitments (as many of its provisions have elements of “best endeavors” language); does not do 
enough to limit special and differential treatment (SDT) to the countries that need it; and further 
moves the WTO Secretariat into the realm of development assistance, something in which it has little 
capacity and no comparative advantage (Finger, 2002; Winters, 2007). Specific criticism has been 
expressed regarding the linkage that is established in the TFA between assistance from developed 
countries and the timing of implementation of commitments by developing countries, particularly the 
implication (and possible precedent) that governments need to be “paid” to undertake reforms that will 
benefit their traders and consumers (Finger, 2014).  
Reservations have also been expressed that putting trade facilitation on the table in the WTO may 
have created perverse incentives to refrain from or delay taking action to reduce national trade costs in 
a misguided effort to use trade facilitation as a negotiating chip to obtain concessions in other areas of 
the DDA, with potentially significant opportunity costs (e.g., Finger, 2008; Hoekman, 2011). Indeed, 
as discussed below, doubts can be expressed regarding the appropriateness of addressing trade 
facilitation in the WTO given that most of its provisions do not internalize an international policy 
spillover—dealing with a prisoner’s dilemma situation where cooperation generates payoffs that 
exceed what a country can obtain through unilateral action. As a result, many of the provisions of the 
TFA are not self-enforcing, raising the question why this issue area should be dealt with in the WTO. 
Others question the very premise that the subject matter addressed by the TFA is important from a 
development perspective and argue it is a mirage, doing little if anything to improve economic 
outcomes. There are different flavors of this argument. One points to the fact that major emerging 
economies may determine for themselves when to implement the TFA. Insofar as implementation is 
left to take place far into the future, the global gains will be much less than what has been projected in 
the policy research literature. Another points to “internal imbalances” in the provisions of the 
agreement, especially neglect of export competitiveness constraints, will result in an asymmetric 
distribution of benefits in favor of high-income countries and/or large multinationals and will worsen 
the balance of trade in developing countries (e.g., South Centre, 2011, 2013). A related line of 
argument is that the case for trade facilitation is grossly overblown by proponents, that the net benefits 
for developing countries are very uncertain and that the TFA may divert attention away from higher 
rate of return policy interventions in developing countries (e.g., Capaldo, 2013). Even if attention is 
limited to the area of trade facilitation, the specific matters addressed in the TFA may do little to 
reduce trade costs in a country or region because other factors – internal transport costs, corruption, 
etc. – account for the lion’s share of total trade costs. 
A basic motivation for large multilateral trade rounds that span many countries and subjects is that 
this helps to agree on a set of disciplines that internalize policy spillovers by permitting issue linkages 
(Sebenius, 1983). A large negotiating set expands the potential for issue linkage, allowing losses in 
one area to be more than offset by gains in another area. In the case of the DDA a package deal has not 
been feasible to construct so far, leading to calls for smaller “self-balancing” packages that are Pareto-
improving in the sense that they benefit many if not all countries without making any nation worse off. 
However, proposals to move away from the Single Undertaking – “nothing is agreed until everything 
The Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement and Rulemaking in the WTO: Milestone, Mistake or Mirage? 
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is agreed” – have been opposed by many WTO Members because of worries that this would lead to a 
situation where issues of most importance to them would be left off the table.
1
  
The TFA was negotiated in Bali as part of a small “development package” of ten decisions that 
mostly addressed matters of concern to developing countries (WTO, 2013). These included an 
understanding on tariff-rate quota administration (for agricultural products), a call for WTO members 
to put in place preferential rules of origin for least-developed countries (LDCs); a decision on 
operationalization of the LDC services waiver (calling for preferential treatment of LDC services 
exports); more extensive monitoring of duty-free and quota-free market access initiatives for LDCs; 
and the establishment of a WTO Monitoring Mechanism to review the implementation of the many 
provisions in the WTO calling for SDT of developing countries. One prominent Bali decision 
concerned public stockholding programs for food security purposes, in which it was agreed to revisit 
the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture pertaining to domestic production support. This 
decision reflected concerns by India that its food stock-holding program threatened to exceed the 
maximum permitted production subsidy under current WTO rules (10 percent of the value of domestic 
production), thus opening up the country to potential dispute settlement action.
2 
WTO Members 
agreed in Bali to a four-year “peace clause” for developing country public food stock-holding 
programs for food security purposes as long as certain transparency-related reporting requirements 
were met, and committed themselves to negotiating a permanent solution to this matter before the 
2017 WTO Ministerial conference. In July 2014 India blocked adoption of the protocol that would 
have incorporated the TFA into the WTO because of purported concerns that WTO members had not 
made enough progress in discussing the agricultural support question in the 6-month period following 
the Bali conference. At the time of writing it is unclear what will happen to the TFA. 
This paper has two main objectives: (i) to discuss why trade facilitation matters and why and how 
an agreement on trade facilitation in the WTO can help improve upon what governments can (and 
should) do on their own; and (ii) to reflect on what we can learn from the TFA for future multilateral 
rule-making efforts in the WTO. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the 
genesis of the TFA talks and the economic rationale for negotiating on trade facilitation. Section 3 
reviews the extant literature on the (potential) benefits and costs of trade facilitation and the state of 
knowledge available to negotiators and policymakers more generally regarding what to 
negotiate/focus on. Section 4 describes the main elements of TFA. Section 5 reflects on some of the 
factors that arose during the negotiations and that affected the eventual outcome. Section 6 discusses 
possible implications of the TFA experience for multilateral cooperation in the WTO looking forward. 
Section 7 concludes.  
2. Why negotiate on trade facilitation? 
Over the last 30 years governments around the globe have greatly reduced tariffs and removed 
quantitative restrictions on imports. Today the international flow of goods, services and knowledge is 
mainly constrained by real trade costs. These reflect a mix of discriminatory policies that inhibit the 
entry and operation of foreign firms that provide intermediate services – a major component of total 
operating costs for firms – and regulatory policies that apply equally to local and foreign firms and 
products. The latter increase costs more for foreign than domestic suppliers simply because regulations 
differ across countries, but more important is that the policies raise costs across the board and thus the 
                                                     
1
 Para. 47 of the DDA makes allowance for “early harvests” such as the TFA without prejudicing the ability of a WTO 
Member to assess the overall balance of whatever eventually might emerge from the DDA as a whole. This leaves open 
however, the question whether such harvests are applied provisionally or become permanent features of the WTO in case 
the DDA never comes to a successful conclusion. 
2
 The Indian government buys food staples from domestic farmers at administered prices. The resulting public 
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price of goods and services for buyers, whether firms or households (Hoekman, 2014). According to 
the World Bank Doing Business report, on average it takes three times as many days, nearly twice as 
many documents and six times as many signatures to trade in many African countries than in high 
income economies (Djankov et al. 2010). Every extra day it takes in Africa to get a consignment to its 
destination is equivalent to a 1.5% additional tax (Freund and Rocha, 2011). 
The genesis of trade facilitation discussions in the WTO was concern by the global business 
community that inefficient border management procedures and controls were becoming an 
increasingly important impediment to global sourcing and international production sharing. WTO 
members put the subject of trade facilitation on the agenda of the Singapore Ministerial Meeting in 
1996. As a result, trade facilitation became one of four so-called Singapore Issues, the others being 
investment policy, competition policy and transparency in government procurement. Working groups 
were formed to discuss the three other subjects, while trade facilitation was addressed by the WTO 
Council for Trade in Goods given that the subject matter was already covered by WTO disciplines. 
The aim of these deliberations was to determine whether to launch an effort to negotiate new rules of 
the game for these policy areas.  
At the time the Doha Development Round was launched in 2001, many countries did not believe 
enough progress had been made to agree on a negotiating agenda for these issues and left it to the 
2003 Ministerial conference in Cancun to determine if and how to launch negotiations. In the event it 
proved not to be possible to agree on how to proceed on these matters at Cancun. When WTO 
Members regrouped in Geneva in July 2004, it was decided that negotiations would only be launched 
on trade facilitation.
3
 Post-1996 work done by the WTO Council for Trade in Goods identified five 
broad areas to focus on: documentation requirements; official procedures; automation and use of 
information technology; transparency and consistency; and modernization of border-crossing 
administration (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009).  
Achieving a significant reduction in trade costs is a complex challenge. Trade liberalization has an 
important role to play, as traditional trade barriers are often still significant in low-income countries 
(Milner, 2013). However, much of the agenda revolves around administrative practices and 
procedures. Some factors leading to high trade costs are difficult or impossible to change. Thus, a 
small island state located in the middle of the Pacific Ocean or land-locked countries in Africa, Asia or 
Latin America will have higher trade costs than countries (or regions) that have access to nearby ports 
or are located close to large and dynamic economic agglomerations. But a large share of observed 
trade costs reflects policies or factors that can be affected by policy. Examples are border clearance 
procedures, the quality of domestic transport and communications infrastructure and the degree of 
competition on services markets. Without action to reduce transport costs from remote areas, increase 
connectivity and facilitate the movement of goods, services and people across borders, specialization 
opportunities cannot be fully exploited, if at all, and the potential gains from trade will not be 
maximized.  
The multidimensionality of trade facilitation is reflected in differences in what the concept is 
understood to mean in different organizations. At the WTO, trade facilitation refers primarily to the 
reform of border management processes so as to make import and export transactions more 
transparent, predictable and efficient. In other fora, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), trade facilitation refers to a broader set of measures that may have an impact on trade costs, 
including policies that affect the efficiency of transport and logistics services. An even broader view of 
trade facilitation is to include any measure that promotes trade. For example, the International Finance 
Corporation regards programs that expand access to trade finance as a trade facilitation activity. From 
an economic perspective trade facilitation might be defined as encompassing measures that reduce the 
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difference between domestic farm or factory gate prices and the price obtained in a foreign market 
(i.e., the difference between the export and import price).  
Extensive empirical evidence suggests that trade facilitation can give a significant boost to bilateral 
trade, support diversification along the extensive margin of trade, and increase aggregate welfare. 
Trade facilitation is invariably found to benefit both locals and foreigners, although the distribution of 
the gains is a function of market structure, the type of products concerned, etc. There will be losers – 
import-competing industries, customs officials and those who benefit from complexity and 
burdensome procedures (e.g., customs brokers) will all lose rents – but overall both importers and 
exporters should benefit. One important source of benefits is a reduction in uncertainty for traders 
regarding market entry conditions. This is particularly important for small firms, who find it more 
difficult to overcome the fixed costs of dealing with administrative requirements at the border, the 
unpredictable variable costs generated by delays, and the differences in regulations across markets. 
For most economists trade facilitation is a “no-brainer” and the puzzle is why a country should 
need to include this in an international trade agreement. The economic literature has identified several 
possible motivations for trade agreements, including the internalization of terms-of-trade spillovers 
(Bagwell and Staiger, 1999); as a mechanism to address credibility problems (a commitment device—
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998); and to overcome domestic political economy constraints that 
prevent a government from pursing welfare-increasing reforms (Bhagwati, 1988; Hillman and 
Ursprung, 1988; Ethier, 2007). Trade facilitation is difficult to fit into the formal terms-of-trade and 
commitment theories of trade agreements because a lack of trade facilitation simply increases the 
domestic prices of imports and reduces the profitability of exports (for a given world price the exporter 
gets a smaller share if it has to incur red tape costs and plan for delays). Not taking action to facilitate 
trade results in a deterioration of the terms of trade. Moreover, from a growth perspective, high trade 
costs will lock a country out of participation in the supply chain trade that is accounting for an ever 
increasing share of world trade, without generating benefits for local producers as often there will not 
be local demand for the specialized inputs that would otherwise be imported as part of supply chain 
trade production.  
The puzzle therefore is that a government can unilaterally take actions that will improve its terms 
of trade without in the process creating an adverse impact on its trading partners. While the foreign 
country will benefit from a trading partner’s trade facilitation, it does not do so at the expense of the 
country concerned. There is therefore no prisoner’s dilemma situation of the type that often drives 
cooperation on trade policy. The TFA cannot be motivated by the terms-of-trade rationale that has 
become the staple of the formal economic literature on trade agreements.
4
 Instead, the TFA reflects 
domestic political economy and international coordination/collective action considerations.  
The political economy drivers revolve around the rents that accrue to government officials that are 
in charge of Customs and other border agencies, with the TFA negotiations providing a mechanism to 
mobilize importers, exporters and groups in favor of better economic governance around an agenda to 
enhance the efficiency of border management. The pursuit of concerted action by trading partners 
increases the gains and thus the incentives of traders to support trade facilitation reforms. The TFA 
can also be seen as an effort to help solve a coordination problem that is created by countries pursuing 
different approaches and/or imposing redundant costs on business and traders in the pursuit of very 
similar objectives. As discussed below, one dimension of this coordination problem is to address 
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by committing to specific disciplines in a trade agreement. The commitment theory as elaborated by Maggi and 
Rodriguez-Clare is premised on there being a terms-of-trade effect: foreigners must have an incentive to enforce an 
agreement by being able to credibly threaten to withdraw “concessions” they have made. As there is no quid pro quo 
concession of the traditional type when it comes to trade facilitation – foreign countries have no incentive to start 
throwing rocks in their own harbor again to enforce a trade facilitation agreement – enforcement must involve other, 
domestic instruments. 
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asymmetric implementation costs and capacity through technical and financial assistance.
5
 But much 
more important are the mechanisms and processes that will be created or bolstered in implementing 
the TFA, which will enhance the ability of domestic actors (importers, exporters, distributors) to 
defend their interests through domestic enforcement mechanisms.  
Before proceeding, it is useful to address two incorrect claims that are sometimes made regarding 
the TFA. First, some analysts have argued that trade facilitation is a national matter and that there is 
therefore no need to negotiate it. While much can and should be done unilaterally, in many areas 
international cooperation can increase gains/reduce trade costs. This is most obviously the case for 
landlocked countries that depend on what neighbors do to facilitate trade. But more generally, given 
the redundancy in documentary requirements, information demanded, inspections undertaken, etc., 
there is significant scope to reduce overall trade costs through concerted action, i.e., international 
cooperation to adopt common approaches towards customs and related matters.  
Second, trade facilitation is often equated with trade liberalization by advocates of activist 
industrial/trade policy interventions and objected to on the grounds that it will lower protection for 
domestic industries. While a lack of trade facilitation will increase domestic prices and thus benefit 
domestic import-substituting industries, the two areas of policy are quite distinct. Trade facilitation 
involves removing policies that generate excess costs. A country that makes active use of trade policy 
to protect national industries should also have an interest in trade facilitation as it will reduce the cost 
of whatever volume of imports it deems desirable. Using measures that raise the cost of trade is a very 
inefficient way of pursuing a protectionist policy—much better to directly support a desired domestic 
activity. Trade facilitation does not imply a country cannot use trade policies to support domestic 
industries. Arguments that trade facilitation should be opposed because it is disguised liberalization 
are therefore not compelling. Yes, trade facilitation will increase competitive pressures but if the 
policy goal is protection less costly and more transparent instruments should (and can) be used instead. 
3. What to negotiate? Assessing the impacts of trade facilitation 
Trade costs drive a wedge between export and import prices. As a result of this wedge, producers 
export less than they would in a world with lower trade costs, and consumers purchase less of each 
traded product, as well as a narrower range of products, than they otherwise would. Trade facilitation 
reduces the size of the wedge. The big difference with textbook trade liberalization – removal of tariffs 
or quotas – is that a large part of the equivalent of tariff revenue or quota rents is not captured by 
customs officials or domestic industries but instead constitutes social waste (often called ‘red tape’ 
costs in the literature). 
How large are these costs? And to what extent could they be reduced by trade facilitation 
measures? What are good practices in this regard? What specific measures would have the biggest 
benefit-cost ratio? How much can be achieved through unilateral action? How much more could be 
realized through international cooperation and concerted action? When is cooperation a necessary 
condition for achieving trade facilitation gains? Are the benefits of trade facilitation equally 
distributed between countries? What about distributional effects within countries? These were the 
types of questions confronting negotiators and more generally, economic policymakers.  
Much was already known in the Customs and border management community on good practices 
through work done by the World Customs Organization (WCO) and UN bodies such as the Economic 
Commission for Europe. Much knowledge also existed in specialized units in international 
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 Such side-payments are provided by high-income countries. As the transfers are time bound and linked to implementation 
they cannot be used as an enforcement mechanism for sustained application of the TFA’s disciplines over time. Once 
implemented, enforcement is left to the standard WTO mechanisms, including greater transparency for domestic 
consumers, the operation of the TFA Committee, and so forth. 
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development organizations such as the World Bank, the regional development banks and UNCTAD, 
which have extensive experience in the design and implementation of trade facilitation projects. 
However, less was known about the relative impact of different forms of trade facilitation and their 
distributional effects. Negotiators could draw on a policy research literature that analyses trade costs, 
but it was only during the course of the TFA negotiations that research focused specifically on the 
effects of trade facilitation. Prior to the launch of the TFA talks, economic research in this area was 
relatively sparse and primarily motivated by economic development concerns, with a focus on what 
national governments could do to enhance the competitiveness of domestic firms and industries. An 
important contribution of the epistemic community that emerged around trade facilitation was to 
provide objective professional expertise and advice on good practices and areas in which cooperation 
would benefit everyone (see e.g., McLinden et al. 2010).  
Estimating the benefits of trade facilitation writ large 
Economic analysis of trade facilitation has tended to involve empirical assessments of the magnitude 
of prevailing trade costs and their impacts on bilateral trade flows at a disaggregated product level.
6 
Empirical estimates of trade costs have also been incorporated into multi-country computable general 
equilibrium models that focus on industry-level and economy-wide impacts. The more recent 
empirical literature has relied heavily on the World Bank’s Doing Business database for indicators of 
trade facilitation costs (the “trading across borders” indicators). A representative example is Djankov, 
Freund and Pham (2010), who use export time as reported in the database as an indicator of national 
trade facilitation performance. This measure includes the time needed for document preparation, 
internal transport, passage through customs and other border agencies, and port and terminal handling. 
They find that the time to export measure is a statistically significant determinant of bilateral trade 
flows, with each day’s delay associated with a reduction in bilateral trade of at least one percent. In the 
case of Africa, Freund and Rocha (2011) find the number is 1.5 percent.  
Extensive research of this type has been undertaken, all of which comes to similar conclusions: a 
lack of trade facilitation reflected in observed (differences in) trade costs matters importantly as a 
determinant of overall trade performance. For example, Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2003, 2005) use a 
gravity model to estimate the effects of four “trade cost” variables – measures of port efficiency, 
customs clearance, the regulatory environment, and telecommunications infrastructure and 
connectivity – across 75 countries to estimate the bilateral trade impacts for manufactured goods from 
improving country-level performance in these areas to the average in the sample. On average, their 
port efficiency variable – which includes both harbors and airports – accounts for more than half of the 
trade costs imposed by policies in their four areas. Iwanow and Kirkpatrick (2007, 2009) undertake a 
similar analysis, estimating a gravity model augmented with trade facilitation, regulatory quality and 
infrastructure indicators to assess the impact of trade facilitation and other trade-related constraints on 
export performance. They find that a 10 percent improvement in trade facilitation would yield an 
increase in exports of about 5 percent, whereas identical percentage improvements in the regulatory 
environment and in quality of infrastructure would result in increases of 9–11 and 8 percent, 
respectively. Persson (2008) finds that reducing delays at borders in an exporting country by one day 
relative to the sample average would increase exports by 1 percent; and similar decline in an importing 
country would increase imports by 0.5 percent. Spence and Karingi (2011) show that trade facilitation 
in Africa, defined as improvements in the types of indicators used in the literature, increases total-
factor productivity and exports, but that the quality and quantity of physical infrastructure also matters 
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importantly. Dennis and Shepherd (2011) conclude that improving trade facilitation helps promote 
export diversification by making it easier for countries to expand exports along the extensive margin –
new products or existing products to new markets. A 10 percent reduction in the costs associated with 
the aspects of trade facilitation considered by Djankov et al. (2010) is associated with a 3 percent 
increase in the number of products exported. 
A conclusion from this research is that trade facilitation can contribute to better export 
performance, but that improvements in the quality of the regulatory environment more generally and 
basic transport and communications infrastructure (“connectivity”) are equally or more important, in 
supporting export growth. Thus, trade facilitation narrowly defined need not result in a significant 
improvement in export performance. Guidance on how specifically observed trade costs can be 
reduced and what types of interventions would have the biggest cost reduction payoff requires 
country-specific analysis of the type that is undertaken by the World Bank and other development 
agencies which routinely undertake analytical work to identify priority areas for reform. Such analysis 
is equally important for developed countries. For example, Gresser (2013) notes that excessive 
paperwork for exports from the US is one reason why shipping a container through New York costs 
$300 more than in competing ports: the US has some 46 separate federal agencies that require forms to 
be filled in, depending on the types of the goods concerned. 
The economy-wide impacts of trade facilitation on real income (GDP) or welfare can be assessed 
using computable general equilibrium models. Research using such models generally finds that the 
income gains from trade facilitation can be large. Francois et al. (2005) conclude that the national 
income effects from improved trade facilitation can be 2 or 3 times greater than what would result 
from removing all tariffs on manufactured goods. WEF (2013) argues that the ratio is on the order of 
five or more, and that a concerted effort to raise national trade facilitation performance to halfway 
global best practice could increase global GDP by some 5 percent. Balistreri, Tarr and Yonezawa 
(2014) decompose trade costs into three categories: costs that can be lowered by trade facilitation, 
nontariff barriers, and the costs of business services, including transport. Using an 18-sector global 
trade model that includes sectoral estimates of the time costs generated by weak trade facilitation 
performance, they find that action by East African Customs Union members to lower time costs by 20 
percent results in significant gains for the four countries. Improved trade facilitation accounts for 
between 60 and 80 percent of the potential gains from deeper integration.
7
 
Hufbauer and Schott (2013), based on a review of extant literature, both empirical and CGE, 
conclude that significant improvements in trade facilitation could increase exports of developing 
countries by approximately US$570 billion and exports of developed countries by US$475 billion—
for a total of over $1 trillion world export gains. As total world trade in 2013 was some $22 trillion, 
this implies a 5 percent increase in global trade. This is not particularly large in percentage growth 
terms and is comparable to the estimated trade impact of removing remaining import tariffs (WEF, 
2013). That said, such estimates may be too high given that the trade effects of facilitation will depend 
on trade potential. A problem with these type of exercises is that they ignore the endogeneity of 
observed trade facilitation performance in high-performing countries: if there is significant trade 
potential, countries have greater incentives to invest in trade facilitation Thus, if Rwanda were to try to 
emulate what has been achieved by Singapore it would not realize the level of trade performance 
achieved by Singapore. Whatever the impacts in practice will end up being, what is distinct about 
trade facilitation relative to trade liberalization (tariff reduction/removal) is that the real income gains 
associated with a given reduction in trade costs is larger than what would be generated by an 
equivalent percentage reduction in tariffs because trade facilitation involves the removal of real costs 
as opposed to the redistribution of income from producers to consumers that is the primary result of 
tariff reductions. 
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From the perspective of negotiators the extant research suggests that trade facilitation, if pursued 
seriously, could account for a large share of the total potential net welfare gains that might be realized 
by concluding the DDA. At the same time the relevance of the research from a negotiators perspective 
was reduced because the TFA negotiations spanned only a subset of the “trade facilitation” measures 
analyzed. Moreover, most research focused on the benefits of national trade facilitation measures. 
There was little research focusing specifically on the magnitude of the gains from concerted, 
coordinated action by two or more governments. Practitioners identified many areas where such 
cooperation is a necessary condition for realizing trade facilitation gains – e.g., joint border posts; joint 
investment in infrastructure to ensure IT systems can “talk” to each other; sharing of data; adoption of 
common classification and risk management systems; adoption of the same administrative documents, 
etc. Negotiators had less research to draw on that identified where international cooperation (as 
opposed to national action) would have the highest net benefit. This reflects both the difficulty of 
doing such research and the focus of the suppliers of technical and other assistance, which is generally 
country-specific and not geared towards supporting international cooperation.  
Mapping specific measures to trade cost reductions and potential welfare gains 
While the economic analyses provided a strong basis for focusing policy attention on trade facilitation 
broadly defined, the economic literature was less helpful in identifying what specific trade facilitation 
measures more narrowly defined would have the biggest benefits. International organizations such as 
the WCO and the World Bank provided expert knowledge on good practices and cross-country 
experience with trade facilitation projects in developing countries, and provided information on what 
they deemed to be priorities.
8
 A recurring theme of the reports, briefings and presentations by trade 
facilitation and Customs experts was that the measures being proposed and considered in the TFA 
talks constituted good practices – i.e., they had been validated in practice and were endorsed by expert 
practitioners – but that identification of what needed to be done to most effectively facilitate trade 
required country-level analysis and diagnostics, and that priorities were endogenous – a function of 
many other factors (e.g., World Bank, 2006). However, as discussed in Finger (2008), the expert 
community did generally agree on what types of trade facilitation measures deserved to be prioritized 
in terms of likely impact on trade costs and which of these would give rise to relatively low as 
opposed to high implementation costs – both financial and in terms of administrative complexity. 
Extensive diagnostic work was undertaken by the WTO, the WCO, the World Bank, regional 
development banks, the ITC and UN bodies (UNCTAD, UN regional Economic Commissions) to 
assess the “gap” between the status quo prevailing in a developing country on customs and transit 
matters that were the main focus of TFA talks and what would need to be done to implement a given 
set of potential disciplines, including informed guesstimates of the cost of closing the gaps (i.e., 
implementation costs associated with a TFA). This generally suggested that implementation costs of a 
TFA would be relatively small – with estimates on the order of US$7-11 million for a sample of 
representative developing countries (see, e.g., McLinden, 2011; Jackson and McLinden, 2013; OECD, 
2012).
9
 However, this detailed, technical work made no promises that implementation would generate 
gains of the order of magnitude suggested by the empirical research literature discussed above. The 
main focus of the various specialized international organizations was to provide information on best 
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practice, lessons of experience, and tools to assess priorities and guide reforms.
10
 Staff from 
international organizations echoed the findings of the empirical research that while trade facilitation 
measures of the type discussed in the TFA talks would contribute to better trade performance and 
generate welfare gains, improvements in the quality of the regulatory environment and trade 
facilitation-related soft and hard infrastructure (“connectivity”) were equally or more important – areas 
not covered by the TFA talks. An important example is ensuring competition in the provision of 
transport, logistics/distribution and communications services (e.g., Borchert et al., 2012 and 2014; 
Francois and Hoekman, 2010). A major focus of the trade facilitation diagnostics and projects 
undertaken by development agencies tended to be on transport and logistics, both infrastructure and 
services, areas not covered by the TFA talks.  
The OECD was the only organization to attempt to map what was on the table in the TFA to 
estimates of trade costs and potential trade cost reductions, thus giving a sense of where the potential 
benefits were the highest. Moïsé and Sorescu (2013), based on a comprehensive dataset of trade 
facilitation indicators compiled by Moïsé, Orliac and Minor (2012), estimated that implementing the 
various elements of what was emerging in the TFA talks would lower developing country trade costs 
by around 14 percent. They assess the impact of 16 trade facilitation indicators corresponding to the 
main policy areas under negotiation. The policy areas that were predicted to have the greatest impact 
on trade volumes and trade costs were the availability of trade-related information, simplification and 
harmonization of documents, streamlining of procedures and the use of automated processes. The 
combined effect of improvements in these areas was estimated to generate a 14.5 percent reduction in 
total trade costs for low income countries, 15.5 percent for lower middle income countries and 13.2 
percent for upper middle income countries.
11
  
The cost side of the equation 
Most of the economic literature on trade facilitation assumes that reforms are costless. This is clearly 
unrealistic and reduces the usefulness of the policy research literature from a policymaking/negotiating 
perspective. The response to this issue was threefold: (i) to explicitly consider the costs of trade 
facilitation; (ii) to refer to expert opinion and data on actual trade facilitation projects undertaken by 
countries to assess how high implementation costs were likely to be; and (iii) to limit analysis of 
potential impacts of trade facilitation to measures that do not involve major investments – i.e., to 
exclude infrastructure-related investments. All of these approaches indicated that the benefit-cost ratio 
of trade facilitation was always positive and often high. Buys et al. (2010), for example, find that 
improved road connectivity in Sub-Saharan Africa could expand overland trade by up to $250bn over 
                                                     
10
 Significant resources and effort was devoted to this. To provide just an example of the type of material that generated by 
Annex D and other organizations on the nuts and bolts of trade facilitation, what follows is a snapshot of the first page of 
a list of reports and toolkits posted on the website of the Global Facilitation Partnership for Transport and Trade 
(http://www.gfptt.org/documents): The New Frontier of Competitiveness in Developing Countries: Implementing 
Trade Facilitation; Trade Facilitation and Paperless Trade Implementation: 2013/14 Asia-Pacific Update; Developing a 
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Toolkit for Country Implementation; Risk-Based Compliance Management. Making it Work in Border Management 
Agencies; Preparation of a National Single Window, a Blueprint for Implementation; Trade and Transport Corridor 
Management Toolkit; Post Clearance Audit: Reference and Implementation Guide; Collaborative Border Management: A 
New Approach to an Old Problem; Freedom of Transit: UNCTAD Trust Fund for Trade Facilitation Negotiations 
Technical Note; Paperless Trade in International Supply Chains: Enhancing Efficiency and Security; Behind the Border 
Trade Facilitation in Asia-Pacific: Cost of Trade, Credit Information, Contract Enforcement and Regulatory Coherence; 
Trade Facilitation Opportunities for Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries. 
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 Updated estimates published in OECD (2014) to take into account the outcome of the Bali negotiations were 14.1%, 
15.1% and 12.9% for the three country groups, respectively The highest impacts for low-income countries would stem 
from a reduction in documentary requirements; automation, and improved information availability (3%, 2.4% and 1.7% 
respectively). In contrast the top three impacts for upper middle-income countries would come from fewer procedures, 
automation and measures pertaining to advance rulings (2.8%, 2.3% and 1.3%). 
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15 years. Using detailed World Bank data on road projects, they estimate that the initial investment 
cost required would be of the order of $20bn, with an additional $1bn annually for maintenance. Thus, 
the costs of this type of trade facilitation would be offset by the associated trade gains. Similarly, 
Mirza (2009) concludes that increasing Sub-Saharan Africa’s logistics performance by 1 percent 
would involve an up-front investment of some $18bn, but that this would generate a welfare gain of 
some $70bn. More detailed, micro-econometric studies of the impact of projects to facilitate trade also 
found that the return on investment was high and that benefits exceed costs (e.g., Cali and te Velde, 
2011; Busse et al. 2012; Königer et al. 2011; Portugal-Perez and Wilson, 2012; Helble et al., 2012; 
Hoekstra, 2013). 
4. The Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement 
The WTO has no provisions dealing explicitly with trade facilitation. Instead, it has specific Articles 
dealing with aspects of the customs clearance process: Art. V GATT on the treatment of goods in 
transit; Art. VII GATT on valuation of goods and the Uruguay Round Agreement on Customs 
Valuation; Art. VIII GATT on fees and formalities; Art. X GATT requiring transparency of national 
trade regulations; the Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection (PSI),
12
 the Agreement on Import 
Licensing and the Agreement on Rules of Origin.
13
 The Agreement on Trade Facilitation follows the 
precedent of the Agreement on Customs Valuation and other agreements (e.g., on antidumping and on 
subsidies and countervailing measures) by extending disciplines on matters addressed by one of more 
specific GATT articles—in this case GATT Arts. V, VIII and X. 
Deliberations in the Council for Trade in Goods on trade facilitation after the 1996 Singapore 
Ministerial meeting made clear that while there was a general agreement on the importance of trade 
facilitation, many developing countries were not very enthusiastic about launching negotiations on the 
subject in the WTO. Part of the concern related to potential implementation costs. Some governments 
argued that they did not have the resources to modernize customs procedures and many were reluctant 
to take on legal obligations that might increase their exposure to WTO disputes. Developed countries 
sought the establishment of binding norms in the WTO; many developing nations preferred to identify 
voluntary guidelines or an accord focused on capacity-building, rather than legally-binding 
commitments. Many countries, including emerging economies such as Brazil, India and South Africa 
also sought agreement on modalities of cooperation between Customs authorities.  
After years of exploratory discussions, and a failure to launch negotiations on trade facilitation at 
the 2003 WTO ministerial conference in Cancun, WTO members eventually agreed to commence 
negotiations in July 2004, on the basis of modalities contained in Annex D of the WTO General 
Council Decision on moving forward on the DDA – the so-called “July package” (WTO, 2004). 
Negotiations were to “aim to clarify and improve relevant aspects of” GATT Article V (Freedom of 
Transit), Article VIII (Fees and Formalities connected with Importation and Exportation), and Article 
X (Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations) “with a view to further expediting the 
movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit….[and] enhancing technical 
assistance and support for capacity building in this area.”  
Much of Annex D addresses the implementation cost concerns of developing countries. Separate 
articles specify that “the extent and timing of entering into commitments shall be related to the 
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importation.  
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 This agreement aims to foster the harmonization of the rules used by WTO Members for their nondiscriminatory (MFN) 
trade, i.e., it excludes rules that apply in the context of preferential trade agreements. Notwithstanding almost 20 years of 
discussion in a Technical Committee (serviced by the WCO, which acts as the secretariat for the committee) tasked with 
pursuing a harmonization work program, the WTO Committee on Rules of Origin has yet to agree on a common set of 
non-preferential rules of origin.  
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implementation capacities of developing and least-developed Members” (Art. 2); that “Members 
would not be obliged to undertake investments in infrastructure projects beyond their means” (Art. 2); 
that as “an integral part of the negotiations, Members shall seek to identify their trade facilitation 
needs and priorities … and shall also address the concerns of developing and least-developed countries 
related to the cost implications of proposed measures” (Art. 4). Articles 8 and 9 call on international 
organizations (with specific mention of the IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, WCO and the World Bank – the 
so-called Annex D organizations) to undertake a collaborative effort to make technical assistance and 
capacity building in this area more effective and operational, and to ensure better coherence, and that 
due account be taken of the relevant work of the WCO and other relevant organizations in this area. 
Art. 6 Annex D encapsulates one of the key challenges confronting negotiators in designing the 
TFA: 
“Support and assistance shall also be provided to help developing and least-developed countries 
implement the commitments resulting from the negotiations. …In this context, it is recognized that 
negotiations could lead to commitments whose implementation would require support for 
infrastructure development on the part of some Members. In these limited cases, developed 
country Members will make every effort to ensure support and assistance directly related to the 
nature and scope of the commitments in order to allow implementation. It is understood, however, 
that in cases where the required support for such infrastructure is not forthcoming, and where a 
developing or least-developed Member continues to lack the necessary capacity, implementation 
will not be required. While every effort will be made to ensure the necessary support and 
assistance, it is understood that the commitments of developed countries to provide such support 
are not open-ended.” 
The contours of a possible deal on substantive matters had become clear by 2008. This included an 
emerging consensus that a single and binding agreement was needed. It was expected that all WTO 
members would sign an agreement, with specific commitments detailed in an implementation plan 
(with varying timelines) based on three specific categories of commitments: those taking effect 
immediately; those requiring a transition period; and those requiring both additional time and technical 
assistance before entering into force. Examples of what might be embodied in an agreement included 
establishment of an enquiry point for information on trade regulations (drawing on precedents 
established in the WTO SPS and TBT Agreements); a requirement to provide advance rulings on tariff 
classification and valuation; creation of a formal border agency “cooperation mechanism” for the 
exchange of information among members; limits on inspection of goods in transit; and elimination of 
proscribed transit routes (WTO, 2008; Eglin, 2008). Much of this ended up being embodied in the 
TFA that was agreed in Bali in 2013, with much of the focus of discussions post-2008 centering on 
how substantive disciplines should be implemented by developing countries, and whether a TFA 
would constitute a stand-alone agreement or whether what was agreed would be limited to amending 
existing GATT provisions (Arts. V, VIII and X).  
The TFA has three parts. Section I lays out substantive disciplines, Section II specifies special and 
differential treatment (SDT) provisions and defines the approach taken to implementation of 
disciplines by developing countries, and Section III deals with institutional arrangements (WTO, 
2014). 
The Substance: Section I of the TFA  
What follows briefly summarizes the main elements of Section I TFA, including an indicative 
judgment of the extent to which a provision is binding as opposed to setting out good practices that 
should be applied insofar is possible (‘best endeavors’ type commitments). The latter is inherently 
subjective as there can be differences in view regarding whether best endeavors provisions are 
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enforceable, and, indeed, how relevant in practice this distinction is, a matter discussed further below. 
Section I of the TFA includes provisions on:
14
 
1. Publication of information. A requirement to publish regulations on trade procedures, taxes, 
fees, etc.; and best endeavors language on using the internet (portals; websites) and creating 
national enquiry points. (Mix of binding and best endeavor language) 
2. Opportunity to comment. Commitment to provide opportunities to comment on proposed new 
regulations relating to movement, release, clearance etc. of goods. (Mix of binding and best 
endeavor language). 
3. Advance rulings. Binding commitment to provide traders with advance rulings on a timely 
basis when requested to do so regarding tariff classification and origin criteria; a best 
endeavor’s commitment to do the same for the criteria used to determine valuation, 
exemptions, and quotas, including tariff quotas. (Mix of binding and best endeavor language) 
4. Appeal or review of decisions. Binding commitment on the right to either administrative and/or 
judicial review of decisions on a nondiscriminatory basis on Customs matters; best endeavors 
commitment to offer the same for decisions of other border management agencies. (Mix of 
binding and best endeavor language) 
5. Other measures to enhance impartiality, nondiscrimination and transparency. Lays out 
procedures to be followed when implementing enhanced SPS--related border controls 
(binding).  
6. Fees and charges. Requirements on transparency (publication), permitted level of fees and 
charges (to be cost based) and the basis/process for imposition of penalties (binding). 
7. Release and clearance of goods. (Mix of binding and best endeavor language). This article 
includes provisions calling for: 
 pre-arrival processing (binding);  
 use of electronic payment (best endeavors);  
 procedures allowing for separation of release of goods from final determination of 
payment liability (binding);  
 adoption and use of risk management systems for clearance control (best endeavors); 
adoption/use of post-clearance audits (binding);  
 measurement and publication of average release times (best endeavors);  
 providing at least three of seven possible types of additional facilitation measures for 
“authorized operators” – with eligibility to be determined on the basis of satisfying 
published criteria relating to risk and track record of compliance (binding); 
 putting in place procedures allowing for expedited release of air cargo shipments and 
specifying the types of criteria that may be used to condition eligibility for expedited 
release (binding); and  
 requirements pertaining to the release of perishable goods (binding). 
8. Border agency cooperation. Call for cooperation between adjacent border posts (e.g., 
alignment of working times, procedures, common facilities, etc.) and exchange of 
information/data when requested (best endeavors). 
9. Formalities associated with cross-border movement of goods, including transit. (Mix of 
binding and best endeavor language) 
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 commitment to review and assess extant procedures from a trade facilitation perspective 
and to adopt the least trade restrictive measure to achieve underlying policy objectives;  
 acceptance of copies of documents already provided (mix of binding and best endeavor);  
 use of international standards (best endeavor);  
 establishment of “Single Window” systems (one-stop shops) (best endeavors);  
 a ban on mandatory PSI for classification/valuation (binding);  
 a ban on introduction of new requirements mandating the use customs brokers (binding); 
and  
 provisions on treatment of rejected goods and use of temporary admission programs for 
inward and outward processing of goods (binding). 
10. Freedom of transit. Commitment not to impose non-transport-related fees or to seek voluntary 
restraints (binding); various disciplines on inspection and guarantee schemes (mostly binding). 
11. Customs cooperation. Provisions calling for sharing of information on best practice and on 
cooperation between customs agencies to exchange information on consignments (best 
endeavors). 
12. Institutional arrangements (Section III, TFA). The agreement calls for the establishment of a 
Committee on Trade Facilitation in the WTO, with a mandate inter alia to maintain “close 
contact” with other international organizations in the field of trade facilitation such as the WCO 
(the only agency mentioned by name), and for the establishment of national trade facilitation 
committees in each WTO Member to facilitate the required domestic coordination and 
implementation of the TFA. 
A number of these substantive disciplines build on work done in the WCO—in particular 
provisions on appeal and review (Art. 4 TFA) and release and clearance of goods (Art. 7 TFA) (ITC, 
2013). In the 1990s, WCO members negotiated a revision of the 1974 International Convention on the 
Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures. An updated and completely revamped 
Kyoto Convention establishing ‘international standards and facilitative customs procedures for the 
twenty-first century’ was completed in 1999 (WCO, 2002). This comprises a set of principles and 
detailed annexes that lay out standards and recommended best practices for customs procedures and 
related administrative practices, including risk assessment, electronic data interchange, use of ex-post, 
audit-based systems of control, import and export procedures, transit arrangements, and bonded 
warehousing. As of September 2014, 95 countries had signed the Revised Kyoto Convention, out of a 
total of 178 WCO member countries. Implementation of the TFA will imply that some areas covered 
by the Kyoto convention will over time extend to larger number of nations. 
As is described above, some of the TFA provisions can in principle be enforced through the WTO 
dispute settlement system. Others are of a best endeavors nature. Many of the latter either address 
matters that will require investment in soft and hard infrastructure, or that are sensitive (e.g., Customs 
cooperation and exchange of information, something on which there were and are concerns by 
developed countries and not just developing economies). Binding commitments tend to pertain to 
matters relating to transparency, fees and procedures that are imposed or applied by customs 
authorities. The activities of other government agencies at the border, if addressed at all, tend to be of 
a best endeavors nature. 
Several provisions in the TFA are of interest from a political economy perspective, including the 
ban on the use of preshipment inspection (PSI) for classification and valuation purposes and the 
provision precluding the adoption of new regulations requiring mandatory use of customs brokers by 
countries that do not require this at present. These provisions are noteworthy because the companies 
involved in providing the associated services are direct losers from the TFA. The bans reflect a drive 
by both traders and Customs authorities. Customs brokers provide valuable services to customers, but 
not all firms need their services. Mandatory use of customs brokers imposes an effective tax on 
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companies that have the capacity to deal with customs compliance requirements at a lower cost than 
what they are required to pay a customs broker. PSI programs involve governments outsourcing 
Customs activities to private companies, often as part of an effort to reduce corruption and tax 
avoidance by traders through misclassification of goods and over-or under-invoicing of consignments. 
Not surprisingly, the Customs community is not supportive of such programs as they imply they are 
not doing their job; traders often oppose PSI because they perceive it as imposing too much of a 
burden.
15
  
The prevailing view of the Customs community and many traders was that PSI may be helpful in 
the short-term to deal with corruption and tax avoidance, but that in the longer-run what is required is 
serious customs reform and institutional strengthening to allow a government to manage the border 
itself (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009). The Customs community used the trade facilitation negotiations 
as an opportunity to reassert their exclusive authority to determine the classification and valuation of 
goods for tariff revenue collection purposes, while traders used it to ensure that there would be no new 
instances of WTO Members requiring the use of customs brokers and thus having to pay for services 
they did not need or desire.
16
 The ban on PSI is not necessarily a feature of the TFA that is consistent 
with trade facilitation given that it may be an effective mechanism to address severe instances of 
corruption in Customs. 
Special and Differential Treatment: Section II TFA 
Section I of the TFA contains a mix of binding disciplines and best endeavors commitments. These all 
apply to developed countries once the TFA enters into force. This is not the case for developing 
countries and the LDCs insofar as these countries invoke the TFA’s SDT provisions. These are spelled 
out in Section II, which deals with the implementation concerns of developing countries by allowing 
them to determine unilaterally when they will apply the various provisions laid out in Section I. 
Implementation is divided into three categories: (A) provisions that will be applied unconditionally 
upon entry into force of the TFA (or after one year in case of a LDC); (B) provisions that will apply 
after a transition period that will be determined by each country itself; and (C) provisions that will 
apply after an indicative transition period and acquisition of the necessary implementation capacity 
through assistance and capacity-building. One year after that they are to notify definitive dates for 
implementation of category B commitments and to report on the arrangements made to obtain the 
assistance needed to implement category C commitments. LDCs have an extra year to undertake these 
actions.  
There are no limits on the length of implementation periods that can be notified – the presumption 
is that countries will undertake a good faith effort to determine how much time they will realistically 
need and will not engage in games. There are detailed provisions on procedures to be followed if a 
country needs an extension of the transition period because it does not think it can implement a 
provision by the definitive date it specified in its schedule, including reporting the reasons for this and 
whether it is because of the need for additional assistance or not having received the assistance 
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16
 It is suggestive that the ban on PSI for purposes of classification and orgin concerns activities that are in the ambit of 
Customs, and that other TFA articles relating to these activites (transparency, review, appeal etc.) are binding and thus 
can be contested through the DSU. 
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needed.
17
 If a country continues to notify implementation difficulties after transition periods have 
expired, the TFA Committee is called to establish an Expert Group of five independent trade 
facilitation professionals to examine the situation and make recommendations. No recourse can be 
made to the DSU until the recommendation the Expert Group has been considered. In any event, there 
are long grace periods for dispute settlement: Category A provisions cannot be contested within 2 (6) 
years of the entry into force of the TFA for developing countries (LDCs); in addition, LDCs have an 8 
year grace period following implementation of their Category B and C provisions. There is no grace 
period regarding Category B and C provisions of developing countries (Art. 20 TFA). 
Donors are to provide assistance and capacity building support, either bilaterally or through 
international organizations, on mutually agreed terms.
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 In the case of LDCs, there is a call for such 
aid to be additional – donors are to endeavor to provide aid in a way that does not compromise 
existing developmental priorities (Art. 21). A long list of principles are specified that aid should 
conform to, including taking into account existing programs of support and the importance of 
coordination between donors and use of existing in-country donor coordination mechanisms. Donors 
are also required to report annually on assistance provided, while international organizations will be 
invited to do so by the TFA Committee. In addition there is a call for the Committee to hold at least 
one annual session dedicated to review and discuss problems regarding implementation, review 
delivery of assistance, and share experiences obtained – i.e., to engage in a process of deliberation and 
learning.  
Thus, the response to implementation concerns was to permit each country to determine its own 
transitional periods and to identify which specific provisions require technical or financial assistance 
and capacity building support. No mention is made of “infrastructure” as a potential necessary element 
of implementing the agreement as in the 2004 Annex D modalities; assistance is simply linked to 
‘implementation’. There is no binding (enforceable) commitment on any Member to provide 
assistance, nor any language specifying whether assistance can have “strings”. Instances where a lack 
of assistance gives rise to implementation problems are to be resolved through a process of identifying 
willing donors and alternative sources of aid.  
5. Reflections on process and outcome  
The TFA illustrates that new rule-making is feasible in the WTO. For that reason alone it is a 
milestone, as looking forward it is clear that it is in the rule-making area that the WTO will confront 
increasing demands. Assuming it is adopted into the WTO, the TFA is also noteworthy by being a 
stand-alone agreement: all WTO Members signed off on it because they perceived it to be a Pareto 
improving deal. 
Negotiations on the TFA took a decade. While this constitutes good performance compared to the 
other areas of the DDA, it is clearly a very long time, especially given the fact that the contours of the 
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 To help address the possibility of some countries “falling through the cracks” as a result of coordination problems, the 
WTO set up a Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility in 2014. The aims of the facility are to enhance the WTO’s technical 
assistance programs, support coordination between donors and recipients, and provide a source of funding for countries 
that are not able to access assistance through other channels for TFA implementation. It will do so by providing up to 
US$30,000 for project proposal preparation (to submit to a donor agency for funding) and up to US$200,000 for “soft 
infrastructure” projects if a country cannot find a donor to fund it (examples of potential projects include payment of 
consulting services for modernization of customs laws, in-country workshops, and training of officials). The Facility will 
become operational following the adoption of the TFA Protocol. 
 See http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/fac_22jul14_e.htm.  
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 Footnote 16 of the TFA specifies that assistance and support for capacity building “may take the form of technical, 
financial, or any other mutually agreed form of assistance provided.” The inclusion of the word ‘financial’ was a 
negotiating objective of many developing countries, whereas some developed countries preferred to leave the type of 
assistance undefined. 
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TFA were pretty clear already in 2008, and the basic principle of linkage between implementation by 
developing countries and assistance from developed nations had already been established in the 2004 
negotiation modalities. At least five factors help explain the slow progress and the shape of the 
eventual agreement. 
First, the overall difficulty of moving the DDA negotiations forward was an important factor. Trade 
facilitation was often singled out by WTO negotiators as one area where there was a constructive 
atmosphere in which good progress was being made, but the deadlock that prevailed for long periods 
of time on the DDA market access agenda meant that there was less pressure on negotiators on trade 
facilitation to agree on a text in a more timely fashion. At the same time the deadlock itself is partly 
explained by a desire on the part of some countries to extract a “payment” for agreement on trade 
facilitation. This is part and parcel of the modus operandi of the WTO (making the outcome of a trade 
round a ‘single undertaking’). While there is arguably little negotiating leverage associated with trade 
facilitation for the reasons discussed in Section 2, countries nonetheless sought to pursue issue linkage. 
Ultimately linkage incentives led to India’s refusal to adopt the TFA protocol, but that was simply 
another – albeit extraordinary – instance of a strategy that had been pursued throughout the 
negotiations by a number of countries, not just India. 
Second, trade facilitation is a technical area, and much learning was required by trade officials who 
are not necessarily aware of what is involved in putting in place risk management systems, what is 
implied by a “single window” for border management and customs clearance, etc. A very substantial 
effort was undertaken by the WTO and Annex D organizations to provide information and educate not 
just negotiators but stakeholders more generally. This was arguably effective in that the initial 
skepticism on the part of many developing countries regarding trade facilitation was overcome, and 
negotiations proceeded relatively smoothly without major fundamental substantive differences of the 
type that characterized negotiations on intellectual property rights in the Uruguay Round, to give one 
example.
19
 However, the very length of the negotiations meant that there was regular turnover of 
negotiators, implying a need for repeated learning on the part of a new set of officials to get up to 
speed on the substance of the many technical issues that were on the table.
20
 This was a factor that 
affected developing countries in particular but it also affected the “supply side” – sustaining the 
engagement and support of specialized agencies and trade facilitation professionals in a process that 
lasts many years without a clear prospect of coming to a resolution is difficult, especially for 
development-focused organizations where performance is assessed on the basis of the impacts of 
projects and activities in which resources are invested. 
Third, and related to the foregoing, a feature of the negotiations from the start was not just to 
ensure that poor countries would benefit from whatever was agreed but that they would be able to 
implement an agreement so as to realize the benefits. The issues here were to figure out what would be 
needed for effective implementation, how to obtain a credible commitment from developed countries 
that they would provide the assistance needed for implementation to the countries that indicated that 
this was needed, and to address concerns by developing countries about being subject to disputes and 
the threat of retaliation for not having been able to implement TFA disciplines. As discussed above, 
although in principle the link between implementation and assistance had already been agreed in 2004, 
exactly how this was to work was left to negotiators to determine. It proved difficult to craft an 
approach that was acceptable to everyone around the table, with the end result the adoption of the à la 
carte approach regarding the timing of implementation of the various TFA provisions by developing 
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 Because strengthing IPRs has redistributive effects and thuis need not be win-win. Research has demonstrated that the 
TRIPS agreement implied a significan net tranfer from many developing countries. See e.g., McCalman (2001). 
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 The many seminars and workshops arguably were less effective in changing attitudes towards the trade facilitation 
negotiations than they were in increasing understanding of the salience of the subject from a national development 
perspective. The technical assistance seminars and workshops delivered by development organizations tended to focus on 
what constitutes good practice as opposed to understanding where joint action was needed to lower trade costs. 
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economies. Key elements of what was ultimately included in Section II of the TFA were only agreed a 
few days before the Bali conference. 
Trade facilitation will require some investments, and negotiators initially confronted substantial 
uncertainty as to what would be involved in implementing TFA provisions in their countries. The 
response to this uncertainty included an extensive process of national “needs assessments” by the 
WTO Secretariat and Annex D organizations and numerous trade facilitation seminars and workshops. 
The outcome of national needs and gap assessments were not made public, however, reflecting the 
perverse incentives associated with taking a “negotiation mindset” to the issue. This uncertainty 
created a problem for developed country providers of assistance as well, as they did not want to be 
confronted with open-ended financial commitments. Nor were they willing to create a fund with 
earmarked resources to support trade facilitation (whether managed by development agencies as 
advocated by some analysts, e.g., Bhagwati (2005), or in the WTO). In large part this reflected a desire 
not to create a precedent that would increase the incentives for countries to take a “pay me for reform” 
position in future negotiations. But it also reflected desire to abide by the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, under which donor countries have committed to align support with the priorities 
established by developing countries in their national development strategies when allocating assistance 
(country ownership and alignment principles).  
The TFA leaves it to developing country governments to determine when to implement provisions 
based on their own self-assessment and in that sense is consistent with the aid effectiveness principles. 
It is important to note however that the TFA does not have language regarding the “conditionality” 
that might be imposed by donors. While the implicit presumption may be that assistance will be grant-
based, in practice this type of aid is increasingly earmarked for the poorest countries. Middle income 
countries – whether large nations such as India or Brazil (assuming they make any category C 
commitments) or small island economies such as Barbados or Mauritius – may not be eligible for 
grant based assistance. Throughout the negotiations and after the Bali meeting the international 
organizations made clear that they stood ready to support developing countries, but what conditions 
would apply to assistance were often left ambiguous. Thus, a joint statement issued by the ITC, 
OECD, UNCTAD, the UN Regional Economic Commissions, the World Bank and the WCO on July 
22, 2014 says nothing about this (Joint Statement, 2014). As far as its own support is concerned the 
World Bank made it clear that assistance for TFA implementation through its Trade Facilitation 
Support Program “will prioritize (1) International Development Association-eligible, low-income, and 
fragile and conflict affected countries; and (2) middle-income countries that act as gateways to LDCs 
and/or whose performance significantly impact on the performance of regional LDCs as well as those 
that are willing to co-finance technical assistance activities” (World Bank, 2014).21  
Donors consistently argued that they could be trusted to deliver the amounts needed and 
international agencies repeatedly stated that they would provide assistance if requested to do so. Recall 
that expert assessments suggested that TFA implementation costs would be in the range of US$7-11 
million for a representative sample of developing countries, ignoring investments in hard 
infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, warehouses, laboratories, etc.). If we assume a rather conservative 
US$10 million and assume further that most developing country WTO Members request assistance we 
are talking about at least US$ $1 billion. This is not a huge amount, especially considering that costs 
will be spread over several years and that some developing countries may not make Category C 
commitments. But this amount is a lot larger than what the various grant facilities that have been set 
up by different international organizations add up to. For example, the World Bank Trade Facilitation 
Support Program was launched with an initial funding commitment of just US$30 million. In practice 
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 Six donors have commited to contributing US$30 million to this facility, with the World Bank website indicating that the 
IMF, IDB, UNCTAD, the WCO and the WTO are partners, although the documentation provided does not discuss what 
the role of these other organizations is. See https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/advisory-services/regulatory-
simplification/trade-logistics/trade-facilitation-support-program/our-partners.cfm. 
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the resources needed to pursue trade facilitation more broadly will be much greater than $10 million 
per country. It seems clear that many developing countries should plan to tap available resources under 
general development assistance programs and borrow the needed funds from the multilateral 
development banks. Given the high rates of return to trade facilitation discussed in Section 3 this will 
be money well spent, but there is a risk that some countries may argue that having to borrow for trade 
facilitation projects addressing matters covered by the TFA is not what they were looking for. 
Fourth, the TFA negotiations broke no new ground as regards the criteria for eligibility for SDT. 
Developing country status is self-defined in the WTO, so that in principle SDT applies to Argentina or 
Brazil in the same way as it does to Armenia or Belize. The only formally defined group of developing 
countries in the WTO are the LDCs, which benefit from additional SDT. As a result, how much of a 
difference the TFA will make in lowering global trade costs will depend importantly on what the 
emerging economies decide to do in terms of implementation of the various TFA provisions, i.e., 
which they will implement immediately and which will be left for later, and how long the self-
determined implementation periods will be for the latter category. As the time of writing this remains 
unknown. From a systemic perspective the positive impact of the TFA would be enhanced if the 
BRICS and other advanced developing economies were to implement all provisions under Categories 
A and B, and commit to short implementation periods. If so, this would help address a major problem 
that characterizes the approach towards SDT in the WTO and that arguably made it more difficult to 
get to yes in the DDA—the fact that such a broad range of countries can and do claim developing 
country status in the WTO. It has proven to be impossible to deal with this matter head-on in the 
WTO. The TFA offered an opportunity to address this question at least for purposes of trade 
facilitation, but this opportunity was not pursued.  
How the large emerging economies – the BRICS, Indonesia, Turkey, etc. – decide to implement the 
TFA and effective delivery of aid for trade facilitation to low-income countries will be two key 
determinants of the success of the TFA. To maximize the development/real income impacts, the focus 
of attention must go beyond the TFA provisions narrowly defined, whether binding or best-endeavors, 
as the research literature and country experience makes very clear that lowering trade costs involves 
action on a broader front (e.g., logistics, transport service sector, etc.). This implies that much depends 
on the extent to which the process of implementation of the TFA will be integrated into national 
development trade strategies, and the extent to which the TFA Committee and the various facilities 
that are established to provide support take a broader perspective. If the TFA helps countries to focus 
on the broader trade facilitation agenda in the process of implementing the agreement, it can become 
an important focal point for deliberation and reform and add value to what development organizations 
are already doing. Even if this is not achieved, the TFA adds value by focusing attention on a number 
of areas where cooperation between countries will be beneficial (i.e., is a necessary condition for 
gains). If the TFA serves as a coordination device – between agencies within countries, across 
countries, and between providers of assistance – it will generate the greatest benefits for members. 
This is of course not assured by any means. The burden of coordination rests on the countries 
concerned, and depend on the ability of governments to identify priorities for action and how the 
various TFA provisions “fit” into the broader national (and regional) trade facilitation agenda. 
Finally, negotiators were not just seeking to ensure that the TFA would be Pareto-improving in a 
self-balancing sense – i.e., ensuring that the substantive rules constituted good practices for trade 
development and that implementation constraints would be addressed. They were also concerned 
about the distribution of the overall gains from trade facilitation. An illustration of this was the 
argument that global value chains (GVCs) tend to be dominated by large “lead” firms that are 
headquartered in developed nations and that trade cost reductions will be mostly appropriated by these 
companies because they have market power and/or their suppliers are locked into dealing with specific 
lead firms (Mayer and Milberg, 2013). A key issue then is whether firms have market power and if it 
is used to extract rents. There is very little empirical evidence on this issue. Hoekman and Shepherd 
(2013) analyze available firm-level data for a large number of developing countries to assess the 
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effects of observed changes in average trade time costs and find that firms of all sizes benefit from 
improved trade facilitation – all firms export more in response to reductions in the time required to 
export goods. While suggestive, this does not address the question of how trade facilitation benefits 
are distributed, which requires information on profits (rents) as opposed to trade volumes. This is an 
area where more research would have been helpful. 
6. Possible implications for cooperation looking forward 
What does the TFA suggest for future rule-making in the WTO? Four aspects of the TFA experience 
appear particularly relevant to this question: (i) the feasibility/desirability of universal membership 
agreements as opposed to plurilateral cooperation; (ii) the balance between hard law and self-
enforcing agreements versus “softer” forms of cooperation; (iii) linkages between the implementation 
of new rules and aid for trade; and (iv) the challenge of achieving “policy coherence” within 
governments, within the WTO and across the development community. These issues are all 
interrelated.  
More universal membership, self-balancing agreements? 
The TFA is noteworthy from a systemic perspective because it demonstrates that the WTO 
membership is capable of negotiating new rules of the game that apply to all countries and devising 
mechanisms to assist those members that need it to implement what all have agreed are good practices. 
This is an important precedent. There has been much discussion in the literature about the need for the 
institution to do a better job in recognizing the diversity across its membership and the need to do 
more to agree to rules of the game for policies that can generate negative international spillovers. 
Numerous voices have suggested that greater consideration be given to the pursuit of plurilateral 
cooperation under the umbrella of the WTO (e.g., Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2013). During the period 
when the DDA deadlock prevented movement on trade facilitation suggestions were made that a 
plurilateral agreement could be an alternative (e.g., Finger, 2008).  
A plurilateral agreement might have allowed a “tighter” agreement to be concluded, with less in the 
way of best endeavors language. However, it may well be that much of what is best endeavors in the 
TFA would have stayed that way in a plurilateral as OECD nations do not see eye-to-eye on a number 
of provisions that ended being best endeavors – e.g., customs cooperation. It will be interesting in this 
regard to see what will be achieved in those areas in the TPP and TTIP. There is much to be said for 
having multilateral agreement on a set of good practices, even if many Members may take a 
significant length of time to implement them and many of these practices have a significant best 
endeavors dimension. 
The real question is the extent to which WTO Members are willing to pursue Pareto-improving 
deals on a stand-alone basis. This is a question that affects both plurilaterals and efforts to conclude 
universally applicable agreements and is very much a function of both the feasibility of constructing a 
Pareto-enhancing deal and the willingness of countries to abstain from efforts to link agreement to 
areas that lie outside the ambit of whatever is the focus of a deal. The TFA illustrates that issue linkage 
incentives can be expected to be strong in the context of the WTO and may be a binding constraint on 
the pursuit and successful conclusion of stand-alone agreements. This constraint applies also to the 
plurilateral track. For example, a potential response to a continuing situation where the Indian 
government’s concerns regarding its ability to pursue its food stockpiling and distribution programs 
precludes adoption of the TFA would be for the majority of WTO Members to pursue the TFA on a 
plurilateral basis. However, making the TFA a formal Annex 4 plurilateral WTO agreement will 
require consensus, and it seems clear that no such consensus will obtain. As discussed at greater length 
in Hoekman and Mavroidis (2013) and Hoekman (2014), for plurilateral options to become more 
feasible in the WTO the consensus constraint needs to be addressed. If this cannot be done the result is 
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likely to be ever more preferential trade agreements and a greater focus to pursue issue-specific 
cooperation on areas such as trade facilitation outside the WTO framework.
22
 
Best endeavors commitments and the self-enforcing nature of WTO commitments 
The TFA contains a mix of binding and best endeavors language. A simple count of best endeavors 
provisions (measured by the use of the word “should”) in related WTO agreements (on customs 
valuation and import licensing) makes clear that the TFA has about twice as many such provisions 
than these comparators. An implication is that there is less emphasis on “hard law” and more of a 
focus on cooperation aimed at achieving a set of good practices that all governments support. 
Examples are not just the emphasis on aid for trade facilitation (Category C provisions) but also the 
provisions for early warning/notification of problems; the use of an Expert Group to assess the 
situation in a Member once notified implementation periods have expired, and use of the TFA 
Committee as a forum for the exchange of experiences and deliberation. Clearly the DSU is (will be) 
applicable to all binding provisions over time, and some of the best endeavors provisions with 
conditional language such as “to the extent practicable” or “to the extent possible” may be enforceable 
in that a country could ask a panel to assess whether implementation by the country concerned has 
become practicable and possible. But it is clear that the TFA is an agreement with less of an emphasis 
on the standard mechanism to ensure compliance – it is much less of a self-enforcing agreement than 
is the case with other WTO agreements. One reason for this is that the standard remedy in cases of 
noncompliance – withdrawal of concessions – is not really available: why would a country throw 
rocks in its harbor in retaliation for noncompliance by another nation? Thus, implicitly, and to some 
extent explicitly, different channels are foreseen to sustain cooperation.  
Assessing whether the rather large number of best-endeavors commitments and the linkages to aid 
for trade constitute an effective and efficient approach to improving policies and practices as opposed 
to a more straightforward set of binding disciplines is impossible ex ante. In some areas of regulation 
that generate trade costs and negative spillovers it may be impossible for governments to agree on hard 
(binding) cooperation. What is needed is agreement on principles and processes to foster greater 
communication and exchange of information, to identify redundant and duplicative procedures, and to 
work together in implementing new norms. The many best endeavor provisions in the TFA can be 
criticized as being non-enforceable, but in practice they may work more effectively than binding 
norms would do to lower trade costs for traders over time insofar as the TFA provides a focal point for 
domestic stakeholders to hold governments accountable for better trade facilitation outcomes.  
The extent to which the TFA will help countries around the world improve the operation and 
governance of national border management systems and reduce uncertainty and trade costs for traders 
will depend on what countries decide to do – how long transitional implementation periods will last 
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 In the case of the TFA it is difficult to adopt the agreement on a critical mass basis as there is no mechanism for Members 
that wish to do so to schedule their trade facilitation commitments. The only channel to do so is GATT XXVIII on 
Modification of Schedules. GATT schedules are primarily designed to list tariff and related product-specific 
commitments, not general non-tariff concessions of the type that are the focus of the TFA. In principle GATT XXVIII 
could be used to list such commitments but will require prior agreement on the modalities for doing so. The Accession 
Protocols that have been used for countries that joined the WTO after 1995 might offer a model for the modalities to 
make “additional commitments”. Matters are more straightforward under the GATS where Members may make 
“additional commitments” that are applied on a MFN basis (Art.XVIII GATS). If the efforts to adopt the TFA were to 
fail, another option would be to move it outside the WTO. One consequence would be losing access to the DSU. As the 
grace periods for disputes under the TFA are long this would not be an immediate constraint. In the longer term, other 
mechanisms exist that could be used by countries if they want to employ them as part of a non-WTO TFA – e.g., by 
bolstering the dispute resolution system of the WCO or by using the arbitration services of the International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under its “additional facility rules.” These provide for dispute settlement 
services in non-investment related matters. An advantage of such an approach is that it would offer the opportunity for 
the TFA to be amended to permit companies to raise non-implementation concerns. 
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and the extent to which assistance is successful in helping developing countries to implement the 
agreement. Arguably most important is the extent to which the norms contained in the TFA are seen to 
benefit traders and consumers. The effectiveness of the transparency and surveillance mechanisms 
associated with the TFA – both domestic and in the WTO – are likely to be particularly important in 
helping to converge towards the norms that are incorporated in the TFA. 
Linkages between policy commitments and aid for trade 
Finger (2014) argues the TFA is a repeat of what negotiators have done in the past under the 
GATT/WTO: to create the appearance of legal obligations for developing countries but at the same 
time to avoid substantive disciplines. This is because the TFA’s provisions are not made legally 
binding by developing countries accepting technical assistance and capacity building support. If 
developing countries obtain assistance but end up not complying with TFA provisions, there is no 
mechanism in the agreement to force governments to return the equivalent of the resources that were 
provided for implementation assistance. Conversely, if a country makes commitments conditional on 
receiving assistance, there is no mechanism to force developed countries to provide the required 
resources. While in such cases there is no threat of dispute settlement and enforcement, non-
implementation implies no benefit from participating in the TFA.  
These are important considerations and some of the provisions of the TFA suggest they were 
recognized by negotiators—e.g., having an Expert Group determine what would need to be done to 
permit implementation in instances where a developing country ends up notifying it cannot meet the 
timetable it has scheduled. As noted previously, a key feature of the TFA is that it establishes norms 
that all WTO Members agree make sense. Whether the approach that was adopted will work is an 
empirical question. The proof of the pudding will be in the eating—once the TFA is incorporated into 
the WTO we will learn whether such concerns are valid. Insofar as they are validated, it would prove 
the critics of embedding aid linkages in WTO agreements correct in that there are potentially serious 
opportunity costs associated with the approach that was taken. In practice there are no constraints on 
the availability of technical and financial support from the development agencies. Tapping those 
resources may involve borrowing, but as noted above the return on investment will be high. Not 
investing because of perceptions or the reality of donors not providing grants makes no sense from an 
economic development perspective. But the extent to which governments will actively sustain 
implementation of the norms that are embodied in the TFA will depend more on how effective the 
TFA-related institutional features – especially the domestic ones – will be in dealing with situations 
where vested interests resist trade facilitation. 
Coherence 
The extent to which aid for trade linkages will have a positive impact on trade facilitation outcomes in 
low-income economies will depend importantly on the degree to which the TFA will help domestic 
firms and traders pressure government agencies to implement its norms and principles. But it will also 
depend in part on the effectiveness of the assistance that provided, which in turn depends on the 
willingness and ability of the government to manage the donors. Here one worry is that the TFA will 
lead to a proliferation of development assistance facilities and greater coordination challenges for 
governments. The new TFA facility that will be established in the WTO implies one more 
development assistance fund under the WTO umbrella, adding to the already existing Enhanced 
Integrated Framework facility (for LDCs) and the Standards and Trade Development facility (STDF). 
The WTO facilities are part of an increasingly crowded scene. There are already many funds and 
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facilities that have been put in place by the international organizations and bilateral development 
programs.
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Low income developing countries face a major problem in managing the plethora of donors and 
assistance providers given weak institutional capacity. In their Joint Statement (2014), the 
International Trade Centre (ITC), the OECD, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(representing the UN Regional Commissions), UNCTAD, the World Bank Group and the WCO 
committed themselves to coordinate their support to developing and transition economies in 
implementing the TFA, in close collaboration with the WTO and the donor community. How this 
coordination is to be achieved it not spelled out. It will not happen without putting in place 
institutional mechanisms that create incentives for the various providers to do so. Currently such 
incentives are quite weak. Note that the joint statement only involves a subset of the international 
agencies providing support – e.g., the regional development banks were not included. How the various 
national providers of funding and assistance will co-ordinate within their own governments the 
allocation of assistance so as to support their national trade policy objectives and their international 
trade commitments is another challenge. In practice, at the end of the day coherence will require 
developing country governments to determine their priorities and manage the complicated menu of 
options they are presented with. 
The TFA deals with a rather narrow set of policies centered on border clearance processes and 
transit regimes. As discussed previously, the trade facilitation agenda goes far beyond the subjects 
dealt with by the TFA, which is constrained by the Doha ministerial mandate to issues captured by 
GATT Articles V, VIII and X. Other relevant GATT disciplines – for example, on customs valuation, 
pre-shipment inspection, import licensing, product standards – also have a direct bearing on the costs 
associated with getting goods into foreign markets. The same is true of the GATS – which offers the 
opportunity to make specific commitments on important logistics-related services such as transport, 
distribution, warehousing, etc. that research has shown often accounts for a major share of total trade 
costs confronting firms (e.g., Francois and Hoekman, 2010; Freund and Rocha, 2011). The TFA does 
not require governments to do anything to improve services-related policies that impact on trade costs. 
Indeed, a number of the policy areas that matter for trade facilitation are not on the WTO table at all – 
such as competition policy or restrictions on foreign investment in logistics, transport and distribution 
services. One message that consistently comes from the research literature on trade costs, 
competitiveness and trade facilitation is that a broad view of the trade facilitation agenda at the 
national, regional and multilateral levels is needed. 
From this perspective a key question is whether the TFA will reduce the attention that is given by 
governments to the trade cost agenda broadly defined. The creation of national trade facilitation 
committees and the process of implementing the TFA may do so. In practice it will be inevitable that 
matters not covered by the TFA will arise in national deliberations and inform the design of trade 
facilitation projects. The extent to which such positive spillover effects will arise depends on the 
willingness of government agencies to look at the trade facilitation agenda more broadly. Here again 
this is primarily a domestic challenge. It does not help that there are so many different WTO 
agreements that have a bearing on trade facilitation, with Committees serviced by different parts of the 
WTO Secretariat. 
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focused programs, e.g., the Trade Facilitation Programme (EBRD); the Africa Trade Fund (AfDB); TradeMark East 
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Bernard Hoekman 
24 
From the perspective of international business and consumers around the world, attention is needed 
within governments and in the WTO – and more generally in trade agreements – to address the 
potential “silo problem” that can lead to a focus on the trees instead of the forest. Fostering regular 
communication and interaction between the various committees dealing with different dimensions of 
trade facilitation can help governments to identify gaps and possible overlaps that are important from a 
trade cost reduction perspective. This could be addressed through periodic joint sessions of the various 
committees; by the TFA Committee considering matters with a direct bearing on trade facilitation that 
are covered in other agreements; and/or through complementary mechanisms that bring in the business 
community and take a ‘whole of the supply chain’ view of assessing progress made in facilitating 
trade, without regard to whether policies are covered by WTO agreements (Hoekman, 2014). A 
complementary mechanism to enhance coherence could be to expand the mandate of the Trade Policy 
Review Body to incorporate not just a focus on what countries are doing to implement the TFA but to 
include a whole of the supply chain assessment of prevailing policies in WTO Members, thereby 
helping governments to identify areas where there is the greatest potential to lower trade costs. 
7. Conclusion 
The TFA: milestone, mistake or mirage? Clearly only time will tell. The TFA is innovative for the 
WTO by encompassing a set of rules that apply to all WTO members while allowing for extensive 
differentiation in terms of timing of implementation and explicitly addressing developing country 
concerns regarding their ability to implement specific provisions. If more such agreements can be 
crafted the TFA would be a milestone by demonstrating that new rule-making need not be confined to 
preferential trade agreements. Numerous analysts have called for greater effort by policymakers to 
conclude plurilateral agreements under the WTO as a way of addressing the difficulty of crafting new 
policy disciplines that make sense for all 160 WTO Members. One reason for this is that It often will 
not be desirable to negotiate one-size-fit-all rules of the game on regulatory matters given the 
heterogeneity of the WTO’s membership.24 But even where it is desirable, the first 20 years of the 
WTO have made many increasingly pessimistic about the prospects of negotiating agreements on rules 
among the membership as a whole. The Bali deal on the TFA proves the pessimists wrong.  
While the TFA is a landmark for the WTO, it may not be a milestone in the sense of defining the 
shape of things to come. The difficulty in getting to yes on a subject that so unambiguously will 
improve welfare for all countries suggests the scope for WTO Members to agree on rules of the game 
for other policy areas may be quite limited, even if there is willingness to replicate the TFA-precedent 
of self-defined implementation periods. Other policy areas are likely to entail much greater variance in 
the distribution and incidence of costs and benefits of proposed rules and greater differences in the 
preferences of governments regarding the substance of new norms. If so, even if there is continued 
willingness by developed countries to provide implementation assistance, there will be more limited 
prospects of getting to yes on a stand-alone basis. 
For proponents of active pursuit of trade facilitation initiatives and projects the trade facilitation 
negotiations were rather depressing. Why negotiate about actions that unambiguously promote 
economic welfare? Why insist on strong commitments by developed countries to provide assistance 
for implementing trade facilitation measures that are often low cost and have very high rates of return 
for the countries concerned? Why pay governments to remove rocks that they have themselves 
dumped in their harbor? Development practitioners have a hard time justifying the convoluted deal 
that is the TFA, especially the aid for trade linkages. From a more conceptual perspective one can 
question whether an agreement that is not self-enforcing should be part of the WTO. Many would 
argue that this is an area where policymakers should figure out what make sense and then just do it, 
with assistance from the development community if needed, which is there to do just that and does not 
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need any help from the WTO. As the social rates of return to trade facilitation are high, any resources 
needed for implementation are well spent. Those who take this view would argue that Section II of the 
TFA is a mistake.  
These are all valid concerns, but it must also be recognized that the TFA does more than simply 
define a set of good practices that benefit the countries that adopt them no matter what their trading 
partners do. It also identifies areas where joint action will reduce trade costs – e.g., through 
cooperation between Customs in areas like information exchange and collaboration between border 
agencies. It creates a focal point for governments in an area that matters importantly from a trade cost 
reduction perspective, and offers an opportunity for businesses and traders to get governments to 
engage on trade facilitation more broadly, thus providing a mechanism to help address the reasons 
why governments have not been able to address trade facilitation domestically. How effective the 
institutional mechanisms associated with the TFA are in ensuring that trade facilitation gets more 
attention by governments and supporting the intra-government communication and coordination 
needed for identifying actions to reduce trade costs for firms will be an important factor.  
Another important factor will be whether the TFA will help or hinder efforts by governments to 
coordinate the many suppliers of technical and financial assistance in this area. Both cross-country 
research and experience clearly reveals that trade facilitation as defined by the TFA is just part of the 
agenda. The large potential trade and welfare gains that are identified in the research literature require 
a focus on trade facilitation more broadly defined. This is the bread and butter of multilateral 
development banks, which have the capacity and mandate to take a more holistic approach that 
considers logistics, distribution and transport services and infrastructure in addition to the Customs 
and border management-related matters that are covered by the TFA. Realizing big gains from trade 
facilitation requires going beyond what is covered by the TFA. But also important is that within the 
narrower ambit of the TFA providers of assistance do not duplicate their activities and do more than 
talk the talk of coherence and adherence to the principle of comparative advantage. The potential for 
intra- and inter-agency turf tussles and empire building should never be underestimated – or the 
problems of the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing. The proliferation of trade 
facilitation assistance facilities that have been announced by agencies and donors illustrates how 
difficult it is – and will be – to ensure greater coherence.25  
The TFA demonstrates both the potential for, and the challenge of, constructing Pareto-sanctioned 
agreements that address substantive policy matters and apply on a stand-alone basis. One reason it 
took 10+ years to negotiate the TFA is because a lot of learning was required regarding why trade 
facilitation matters for income growth and economic development, what constitutes good practices, 
and what kinds of disciplines would benefit all WTO Members. This learning took time, and occurred 
with the support and active engagement of an epistemic community comprising the international 
Customs community, trade facilitation practitioners in international development agencies and 
research analysts.
26
 But this was not sufficient. The issue linkage that was required to get agreement in 
Bali puts into question the feasibility of (incentive to negotiate) stand-alone agreements in the WTO.  
The TFA experience is particularly pertinent in this regard because the subject it addresses does not 
lend itself well to issue linkage dynamics. Trade facilitation predominantly benefits firms and 
consumers in the country that takes measures to lower trade costs. In contrast to tariffs or subsidies 
that benefit domestic industries and that can shift the terms of trade in a nation’s favor, a neglect of 
trade facilitation simply raises costs for all industries, domestic as well as foreign. The absence of 
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terms of trade effects should imply that the “linkage value” associated with withholding agreement on 
trade facilitation is limited—nobody should be willing to “pay” much (i.e., make concessions in other 
areas like agriculture) to get a deal done. Nonetheless, many developing countries tried to pursue issue 
linkage tactics in the trade facilitation talks because they wanted other things that mattered more to 
them. This is rational in the context of the mercantilist dynamics that drive WTO negotiations, but it 
was not very effective because of the ‘win-win’ nature of trade facilitation. This allowed the TFA to 
be negotiated as a stand-alone agreement. But the July 2014 decision by India reveals the strength of 
issue-linkage incentives and how these can result in the blocking of an agreement that all WTO 
Members regard as Pareto-improving.  
Both the Indian decision in July 2014 and the efforts of a number of developing countries during 
the negotiations to link the TFA to other issues of importance to them suggests doubts whether the 
TFA will be the first of more stand-alone agreements in the WTO – assuming the Protocol is 
eventually adopted. The Indian action may induce other countries to pursue similar tactics in the 
future. Even the prospects of such behavior may have a chilling effect on the willingness of 
governments to engage in efforts to negotiate stand-alone compacts. The end result may be to induce 
even more of a focus on regional/plurilateral cooperation on rule-making. Alternatively, it may lead 
WTO Members to go back to the drawing board and work on crafting a broad agenda that offers better 
prospects of a Single Undertaking to be negotiated than has been the case with the DDA—something 
that many analysts and commentators have been advocating for some time.
27
 
From the perspective of trade facilitation outcomes “on the ground” it may not matter too much 
whether the TFA becomes part of the WTO. Insofar as one takes the view that the primary value of the 
TFA is to provide a focal point at the country level for trade facilitation reforms, much of value of the 
TFA lies in the hard work of agreeing on a set of good practices and norms and the implementation 
mechanisms that the TFA calls for. The weakness of the TFA in terms of offering foreign export 
interests strong mechanisms to enforce its provisions and thus to make the TFA self-enforcing means 
other institutional arrangements can and must be used to support implementation, including regional 
integration arrangements and concerted action by multilateral development agencies. The epistemic 
community that supported the TFA effort does not need the WTO to continue to provide support to 
governments and stakeholders that aims to improve trade facilitation performance.  
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